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Introduction
In transitioning to smart, sustainable, 
inclusive societies, regional decision-
makers continually take judgements 
concerning highly complex and con-
troversial questions. Part of a region’s 
‘smartness’ is in its policy capacity to bring 
relevant, detailed knowledge about these 
issues to best understand the controversy 
and take the best decisions for their 
citizens (Swyngedouw, 2005, Bevir and 
Rhodes, 2010). However, policy knowl-
edge validity has become increasingly 
defined in formal ‘expertise’, making it 
harder for holders of vernacular knowl-
edge (e.g. community groups, individual 
citizens) to contribute to decision-making 
(Isenhour, 2011). A key issue here is that 
for policy-makers facing urgent pressures, 
citizen-knowledge (diffuse, unruly and 
unknown), is difficult to fit neatly into 
policy processes (Mouffe, 2000).  
Consequently, policy-makers may 
choose to not account adequately for 
that citizen knowledge (Holden, 2011), 
raising the spectre of negative conse-
quences despite the ‘region’ holding 
the necessary knowledge to avoid those 
problems, a clear governance failure. A 
‘smart city knowledge architecture’ is 
the sum of formal/ informal connec-
tions and meeting points (and lacunae) 
between dif ferent kinds of experts 
(policy, academic, citizen) where con-
troversies are discussed and decisions 
taken (Brenner et al, 2012). Truly smart 
regions develop appropriate ‘knowledge 
architectures’ to use vernacular-citizen 
knowledges to opt imise decision-
taking.  Our research question is:
“How can regional policy-makers use 
citizens’ knowledge to improve deci-
sion-making in controversial regional 
issues?”
We address this using a case study 
based on waste water injection into 
depleted gas f ields in Twente (East 
Netherlands), exploring a knowledge 
architecture which emerged as deci-
sion-makers attempted to deal with a 
specif ic ‘controversial entanglement’. 
By exploring its underlying structures 
and dynamics, we contribute to under-
standing effective citizen engagement 
in smart city-region strategy develop-
ment. We highlight the importance of 
citizen knowledge intermediaries (e.g. 
the media, political parties and citizen 
gatherings) in helping decision-makers 
to judge citizen knowledge claims’ 
validity. We argue that these knowledge 
intermediaries need to be more system-
atically understood to deliver ‘smart’ 
city-regional governance drawing fully 
on citizen knowledge.
Waste Water Injection in 
North East Twente
We consider this in one controversy 
where citizens mobilised to challenge 
a professional expert consensus that the 
activity was safe (waste water injection). 
The region, Twente in the east of the 
Netherlands, has seen the Provincial 
executive (Overijssel Province) in recent 
years seeking to innovate in its govern-
ance approach for governance to be more 
‘smart’, (in its own words) in partner-
ship with municipalities, and in which 
the regional knowledge institutions 
(University Twente, Saxion) have been 
extremely proactive in working to support 
that activity.
Our case is of underground waste 
water storage, injecting water polluted 
as a by-product of steam oil extraction 
into exhausted oil f ields. From the 
late 1940’s, natural gas was discovered 
in deep-lying sediments in the north 
east of the Netherlands, including in 
Overijssel.  Although a number of these 
these f ields were quickly exhausted, the 
infrastructure connecting the wells to 
the Netherlands gas pipeline network 
remained. In neighbouring Drenthe, 
250m barrels of oil were extracted 
from the Schoonebeek f ield (from 
1947). Production was suspended in 
1996 because the remaining 750m 
barrel reserves were too viscous to 
prof itably extract given historical ly 
low oil prices (see Figure 2). However, 
oil price rises following the Second 
Gulf War meant steam new water 
extraction techniques made previously 
inaccessible reserves more cheaply 
extractable, offering a new prof itable 
future for the Schoonebeek f ield.
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Figure 1: The position of Twente in Europe
Source: ITC, 2005  (Courtesy of Faculty ITC, University of  Twente)
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From the mid-2000’s, the Dutch oil 
company NAM (De Nederlandse Aardolie 
Maatschappij) decided to restart extraction 
at Schoonebeek using steam water 
extraction where steam from a specialised 
power station is pumped into oil-bearing 
sediments, al lowing oil warmed to 
200°C to f low easily to the surface. At 
the surface, oil and water are separated, 
with oil exported via mains pipeline to 
Germany, and natural gas directed to 
fuelling the steam production centre. 
The re-emerging water is contaminated 
with mineral part icles, unsuitable 
for reintegration into natural water 
resources: treating that water is extremely 
expensive.  NAM’s solution to the 
question of waste water at Schoonebeek 
was injecting it into nearby exhausted 
gas fields, the most suitable being north 
east Twente. Exhausted oilf ields are 
sealed caverns deep underground left 
vacant by oil extraction, and in Twente 
are surrounded by anhydrite (salt) layers 
which guarantees water-tightness. NAM 
announced in 2006 a plan to pump this 
‘production water’ through pipelines for 
injection in north east Twente. In 2008, 
NAM applied to several municipalities 
to change their local structure plans to 
permit pumping. A group of concerned 
local citizens appealed to the Council 
of State (Raad van State) concerning 
the legality of these changes but their 
appeal was deemed inadmissible. Once 
the changes were granted, NAM applied 
to the regulator, the State Supervision 
of the Mines (SodM, Staatstoezicht 
op de Mijnen), for a pumping licence, 
which was duly granted following an 
Environmental Impact Assessment 
(MER) in a framework overseen by 
the Netherlands Commission for 
Environmental Assessment (Commissie 
MER). From 2011 NAM commenced 
both steam oil extraction and pumping 
‘production water’ into underground 
north east Twente.
The emergence of waste water 
injection as a sensitive issue
On 1st December 2014, the provincial 
public TV station, RTV Oost, ran an 
item in its evening bulletin regarding 
oil water injection close to three areas 
of outstanding natural beauty (the 
Engbertsdijk moors, and the Mosbeek 
and Springendal valleys). The report, 
including expert comment from an 
Associate Professor at the VU University, 
suggested considerable uncertainty 
regarding injection’s environmental 
consequences. NAM’s initial response 
was to put out the argument, to regional 
media, on its website and through a 
number of residents’ evenings, that the 
injection was demonstrably safe.
However, further problems emerged 
in the procedure’s apparent safety. A local 
MP submitted 12 written questions to 
the Minister of Economic Affairs in 
January 2015 questioning the safety 
and the risks of injection producing 
earthquakes.  In March 2015, a number 
of houses adjacent to a pumping location 
in a village (Rossum) suffered visible 
subsidence. A local political party, D66, 
took residents’ complaints to NAM 
who in response announced an action 
plan to address the issues of residential 
subsidence. A leakage in the pipeline was 
discovered near Hardenberg (between 
Drenthe & Twente) on 16th April by a 
local farmer. More detailed inspection 
by NAM revealed that the pipes 
themselves had been seriously corroded 
by bacteria in the waste water. Later in 
the month, the Dutch Lower House of 
Parliament (De Tweede Kamer) convened 
an evidence session on oil water injection 
inviting experts from the Universities of 
Delft and Leiden, NAM, SodM, local 
representatives of the municipality and 
water board, but also a representative of 
concerned citizens. Following further 
checks, NAM announced on 5th June 
2015 the suspension of oil extraction in 
Schoonebeek and a suspension of this 
waste water injection.
This suspension came after the issue 
became politically highly sensitive, with 
local, Provincial and national elected 
representatives putting pressure on the 
government. As more evidence came to 
light of leakages as well as irregularities 
in maintenance and oversight regimes, 
local and provincial representatives in 
both Overijssel and Drenthe agreed that 
an urgent priority was restoring citizen 
trust in the process. They therefore 
decided in August 2015 to establish an 
independent Commission to re-evaluate 
the whole waste water treatment from 
basic pr inciples. The Commission 
planned to take a decision on the 
preferred option for the water treatment 
which al lowed meaningful societal 
inf luence over the decision (rather than 
being purely technical and cost-benefit). 
At the time of writing ( January 2016), a 
meeting of a committee of the Provincial 
Government declared the national 
Ministry should realise there was no 
support in the region for waste water 
injections and that the practice should 
be discontinued.
Citizen Knowledge – 
from consultation to 
decision-making
The situation in 2016 suggests that 
the ‘correct’ provincial governance 
decision in 2009 (the time of rezoning 
of pumping zones for injection) was to 
make the decisions subject to a politically 
weighted decision of compet ing 
desirable disposable options rather than a 
technocratic decision rule about whether 
one option (waste water injection) had 
Figure 2: Crude Oil Prices since 1861
Source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Crude_oil_prices_since_1861.png
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suff iciently safe guidelines. The core 
of the 2015 change was a shift from a 
technocratic question (is injection 
safe enough?) to a political question 
(which approach is best for citizens?). 
Technocratic approaches avoid decision-
makers becoming bogged down in every 
single case. However, they simplify 
by restr icting which knowledge is 
considered, which is professiona l 
knowledge from the benef iciary and 
regulator (not citizens). In political 
decision-making, the role of expert is 
destabilised as politicians try to work out 
which of competing claims is most valid.
We stylise this switch from rejecting 
citizen knowledge to destabi l ising 
professional knowledge as a four stage 
process. In stage 1 (2004-2008), decision 
makers were unaware that the decision 
was controversial, and chose to deal with 
approvals for pumping and rezoning 
as technocratic rather than political 
questions. In stage 2 (2008-2011), 
decision-makers taking those technical 
decisions excluded citizen knowledge; 
both municipalities and province used 
the EIA evidence to simply discount 
competing citizen claims. In stage 3 
(2012-2014), decision-makers gradually 
became aware that the citizen knowledge 
and activism ref lected a general political 
controversy that would not simply 
vanish. In stage 4 (2014-date), decision-
makers sprang into action, mobilising 
locally, creating a coalition together 
with a neighbouring province (Drenthe) 
forcing responses from SodM, the 
Ministry and NAM.
The challenge here is developing appro-
pr iate governance mechanisms to 
accelerate progress through these stages 
where necessary for timely decision-
making for optimum regional governance. 
We must note that the regional decision-
making structures are embedded in a 
national system where the national treas-
ury depends heavily upon hydrocarbon 
exploitation profits leading to a systematic 
tendency to favour NAM as a major con-
tributor here. Nevertheless, ‘smart’ 
city-regional governance would have 
been best served by choosing a political 
approach (weigh competing knowledges 
against each other) rather than a techno-
crat ic approach (a l lowing one to 
demonstrate compliance with safety regu-
lations).  So how can ‘smart’ regional 
decision-makers use existing citizen 
knowledges without enmiring regional 
decision-making in endless contestation?
Waste Water Injection as a 
smart city knowledge 
architecture
One might argue that it was only through 
the provincial broadcaster’s (RTV Oost) 
dogged work that the public became aware 
of waste water injection, leading to local 
politicians mobilising and in little more 
than a year uniting around a strong provin-
cia l consensus that inject ion was 
undesirable. This contention overlooks the 
fact that citizens had five years earlier made 
serious attempts to make these arguments 
in public – including appealing to the 
Dutch Council of State. Could a better 
regional knowledge architecture have 
brought this citizen knowledge to regional 
decision-makers’ attention sooner in ways 
that would have led to better decision-
making? Even if the chronology of the 
mobilisation and permit-granting pre-
vented decisive action, there was sufficient 
citizen knowledge in the public domain 
after 2010 for decision-makers already to 
have recognised the issues’ political 
saliency.
A group of concerned local citizens had 
in both permit granting processes sought 
to have their knowledge claims heard but 
had been overruled in both cases. This 
group argued that the environmental 
impact assessment (EIA) had glided over 
a number of problematic issues, notably 
regarding sediment composition and 
NAM’s technical experience to oversee 
injection. In the local planning processes, 
although local authorities received their 
evidence statements, they weighed them 
against NAM’s own expert opinions and 
overruled them. The Province appeared 
to be unable to deal with claims that con-
tradicted or pointed to problems in the 
EIA, to the Province, a foundation of 
their decision-making was that an EIA 
was an independent and authoritative 
assessment of the risks, following a stand-
ard procedure.  In ef fect, loca l 
decision-makers in each case ignored local 
expertise and privileged external exper-
tise, expertise that was later apparently to 
prove misplaced, leading to a strong pro-
vincial mobilisation to attempt to correct 
problems. One might likewise point to 
the citizens’ failure to f ind the correct 
access point on time, having gone round 
Province, municipalit ies, regulator 
(SodM) and eventually the Dutch Safety 
Board (Onderzoeksraad voor Veiligheid) with 
a changing dossier of evidence. Also, in 
contrast to the EIA following an estab-
l ished methodology (from the CE 
consultancy), their evidence was a partial 
mix of literature review, their own 
research and indeed their own experi-
ments (for example testing whether local 
salt in stone samples would be dissolved 
by production water).
Nevertheless, the citizen knowledge’s 
validity was later acknowledged in the 
speed with which regional partners mobi-
lised to take action against the waste water 
injection. Whilst in 2011, local partners 
had rejected citizen knowledge as not fit-
ting within the professional expertise 
model, in 2015 local partners used this 
citizen-knowledge to argue that the 
uncertainty surrounding the expert 
knowledge meant that there was no sup-
port for waste water injection. NAM’s 
Figure 3: The four stages of shift from technocratic to political 
decision-making.
Source: authors’ own design
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assertion that injection was safe was desta-
bilised, becoming regarded not as an 
objective statement of fact but rather a 
subjective assertion on which it was rea-
sonable for policy-makers to take a 
judgement. Ultimately, local decision-
makers proved themselves “smart” in 
availing themselves of citizen knowledge, 
albeit somewhat later than had the appro-
priate connections been made in the late 
2000’s as citizens sought to contest NAM’s 
claims with their own knowledge. 
Considering how citizen knowledge 
acquired a political salience in the 2010’s 
provides a means to develop an archetypal 
knowledge architecture for smart city-
regional governance.
Towards knowledge 
architectures for smart 
city-regional governance
Central in this knowledge architecture 
was a citizen action group: individuals 
who engaged strongly with the issue and 
mobilised a set of knowledge (‘counter-
claims’) which disputed claims made by 
actors in the technocratic decision-mak-
ing process. Around this citizen action 
group were various different bodies criti-
cally testing these counter claims, judging 
them as having a degree of merit com-
pared to the original compliance claims. 
Firstly, was the regional media which 
undertook its own research into the claims 
and realised that the citizen knowledge 
indeed offered a prima facie case of ques-
t ions to an swer, rega rd ing the 
incompleteness and inconsistencies in the 
expert professional knowledge, thereby 
raising the possibility that the injection 
process was not as safe as compliance 
claims suggested. Second, were political 
parties, which channelled local concerns 
and anger at particular local problems, 
such as leakages or subsidence into higher 
level action at the Provincial and parlia-
mentary level. Third, were civil society 
mobilisations, where larger groups of 
concerned citizens came together around 
events such as information evenings or 
consultations around the waste water re-
evaluation committee. Finally, were the 
decision-making bodies themselves, 
which in the case of the Netherlands were 
formed of coalitions between various 
political parties each seeking to placate 
their own supporters and maintain their 
own legitimacy.
This categorisation provides the basis 
to answering the initial research question, 
namely how can regional policy-makers 
use citizens’ lay knowledges in taking 
decisions regarding complex, controver-
sial regional issues? The critical issue here 
involves being able to identify those 
issues demanding political decision-
making rather than just technocratic 
compliance approaches. Citizen knowl-
edge is mobilised by challenging the 
technocratic compliance claims and forc-
i n g  po l i t i c i a n s  t o  t a ke  t he i r 
responsibilities for making a choice 
between competing alternatives. Making 
better use of citizen knowledge in effec-
tively distinguishing those issues which 
require a polit ical treatment helps 
improve the overall quality of decision-
making. In our waste water injection 
case, a variety of intermediaries between 
concerned citizens and decision-makers 
– media, political parties and civil society 
– performed a sorting and judging of the 
validity of the claims and counterclaims. 
They performed a comparable function 
to the intermediaries used in the compli-
ance claims, such as the independent 
environmental impact assessment (MER) 
following a consultant’s methodology, or 
the cost-benef it analysis of competing 
solutions offered by NAM.
We contend that more thought needs 
to be given to the issue of knowledge 
intermediaries and their functioning in 
these complex issues. We are not arguing 
that attention is paid uncritically to citi-
zens who mobilise but rather that smart 
cities will develop effective knowledge 
architectures to evaluate those claims. If 
citizen claims are simply ignored, then 
the governance knowledge becomes 
limited to experts in the official bodies, 
who in turn become dependent on the 
experts provided by those agents that 
they are seeking to regulate.  We are not 
proposing that the knowledge architec-
ture that emerged in Twente i s 
necessarily an ideal type, but provides a 
starting point for developing alternatives 
perspective on mobilising citizen knowl-
edge v i a  va r iou s  c iv i l  soc ie t y 
intermediaries, including political par-
ties, citizen mobilisations and regional 
media. It is possible to consider other 
kinds of intermediaries, such as social 
media, social entrepreneurs, or region-
ally engaged experts.  Future work 
should therefore attempt to bring these 
into a more systemic perspective and 
help to give city-regional decision-
makers with the appropriate knowledges 
they require to take ‘smart’ decisions for 
all their citizens’ benefit.
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 celebrates the launch of the Regional 
Studies Association – Latin America Division last year. In this issue, 
current regional problems faced by countries in Latin America 
and the Caribbean are discussed, focusing on barriers to regional 
integration within and between countries. The articles, edited by 
Pedro Amaral, present experiences of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Ecuador and Mexico, in addition to a summary of the challenges to 
regional integration of the region as a whole.
Latin America and the Caribbean as a region is better-integrated 
and less unequal than it was 20 years ago. However, given its 
strong reliance on commodities’ exports, the recent economic 
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compromise further development in the region. As the articles 
in this issue seek to demonstrate, the path to resilience and 
development is based on increased integration, social justice and 
environmental sustainability.
In our 
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, Paul Benneworth and Willem-Jan Velderman 
examine citizen engagement in smart city-region strategy 
development using the case study of waste water injection into 
???????????????????????????????????????????????
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 section, the region of Apulia, Italy is used to 
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objective of reducing regional disparities and that of investments 
in research and innovation to enhance growth. Chiara Pancotti, 
Emanuela Sirtori and Silvia Vignetti discuss the extent to which 
this “Innovation Paradox” can be addressed by adopting the “smart 
specialisation” approach to regional development.
